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property to her on the date of the breach. The fact that there
was a falling market on and following that date must be considered in connection with the price finally obtained in order
to estimate the value as of the date of breach, but that fact
also must be considered as affecting the price reasonably
obtainable by a seller who first learns on the date of breach
that a new purchaser must be obtained.
In other words, an appraiser in estimating, and a court in
finding, the value to the seller on the date of breach must
necessarily take into consideration the fact that some appreciable time is ordinarily required to find a purchaser ready,
able and willing to buy. The value to the seller on the date
of breach should be the price obtainable on an offering of the
property on that date with allowance for a reasonable time
within which to find a purchaser. Certainly the seller who
does not breach his contract should not have to anticipate
a breach by the contracting purchaser nor should such a seller
have to stand all or any part of the loss necessarily flowing
from the purchaser's breach. Thus, if the price finally obtained in a falling market is the best price which reasonably
could be procured, with due diligence, on an offering made as
of the date of breach, the value to the seller as of such date
would be no more than the price actually obtained.

[L. A. No. 21478.

In Bank.

July 13, 1951.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LOVELL C.
CHAMBERS, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Taxation- Exemptions- Property

of State.- State-owned
property is not subject to taxation, and taxation thereof and
tax deeds resulting therefrom are void.
[2] State of California-Limitation of Actions.-Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 315, must be construed as declaring, in effect, that the state
will not sue "for or in respect to real property'' except where
the cause of action has accrued within 10 years before any
action or other proceeding for the same is commenced.
[2] See 16 Cal.Jur. 414, 435; 34 Am.Jur. 65.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Taxation, § 71; [2, 3, 6, 8] State of
California, § 73 (2) ; [4, 5] Adverse Possession, § 11; [7, 9] Taxation, § 377.1; [10, 11] Taxation, § 319; [12, 13] Public Lands, § 228;
[14-16] Taxation, § 376(1); [17] Taxation, § 324.
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[3] !d.-Limitation of Actions.-As contemplated by Code Civ.
Proc., § 315, the state's cause of action to remove defendant's
tax deed as a cloud on the state's title to real property arises
not on the date the state first acquires title, but on the date
defendant receives his tax deed.
[4] Adverse Possession-Property Held for Public Use.-Neither
Code Civ. Proc., § 315 nor § 318 et seq., which relate to adverse
possession, apply to property owned by the state and devoted
to a public use. ( Civ. Code, §§ 1006, 1007.)
[5] !d.-Property Held for Public Use.-Real property deeded to
the state, accepted for the state by the State Park Commission and included in a state park system, is owned by the
state and devoted to a public use so as to render it not subject
to Code Civ. Proc., § 315, or to § 318 et seq., which relate to
adverse possession. (See Pub. Resources Code, § 5003.)
[6] State of California-Limitation of Actions.-Tacking may not
be used to establish the passage of a period in a statute of
limitation on the state's action to quiet title to its property
devoted to a public use.
[7a, 7b] Taxation-Actions Affecting Tax Titles-Limitations.The limitation provisions, Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 175, 3521, 3725,
relating to actions testing the validity of tax deeds, do not
apply to the state's action to remove a tax deed as a cloud on
its property devoted to a public use.
[8] State of California-Limitation of Actions.-The rule that general statutes of limitation apply against the state and its
agencies when its sovereign rights are not involved does not
require application against the state, in its action to quiet title
to its real property, of a statute of limitation which is not
expressly made applicable to the state, since the rule springs
from Code Civ. Proc., § 345, which deals with limitations on
actions other than for recovery of real property.
[9] Taxation- Actions Affecting Tax Titles- Limitations.- The
1939 enactments of Pol. Code, § 3831.1, and Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 121, which include the state within their definition of a taxing agency, did not nullify decisions rendered prior thereto
holding certain limitation provisions in the tax statutes to be
inapplicable to the state, where such limitation provisions make
no mention of taxing agencies, and the defining provisions are
therefore inapplicable.
[10] Id.-Tax Sales-Consent of Taxing Agency-Effect on Tax
Lien or Rights.-Assuming that "taxing agency" as used in
Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3695, includes the state, the provision
[ 4] Use of property by public as affecting acquisition of title
by adverse possession, note, 2 A.L.R. 1368. See, also, 1 Cal.Jur.
502; 1 Am.Jur. 848.
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refers only to tax or assessment liens of governmental units
other than the county, where it states that if such agency
consents to a tax sale, the lien of its taxes or assessments and
any rights it may have to the property as a result of such
taxes and assessments are cancelled by the sale.
[11] !d.-Tax Sales-Disposition After Deed to State-Authority
of Controller.-Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3694, requiring the Controller to approve the sale of property tax-deeded to the state,
does not authorize him to covenant for the state to the conveyance of its property, title to which was obtained from a
source other than a tax deed, and which is devoted to a
public use.
[12] Public Lands-Disposal of State Lands.-State lands devoted
to a public use may be disposed of only in the manner specified
by statute.
[13] !d.-Disposal of State Lands.-An attempt by an unauthorized state officer to dispose of state land devoted to a public
use is void.
[14] Taxation-Actions Affecting Tax Titles-Reimbursement of
Purchaser.-A private owner of property may not have his
title quieted against a tax deed unless he pays the purchaser
at the tax sale and deed holder the taxes paid by the deed
holder.
[15] !d.-Actions Affecting Tax Titles-Reimbursement of Purchaser.-In the absence of statute, a purchaser from the state
or public agency at a tax sale cannot recover from the seller the
purchase price or the taxes subsequently assessed even though
the taxes were illegally assessed or levied, or the property was
not subjct to taxation or the tax deed was void.
[16] !d.-Actions Affecting Tax Titles-Reimbursement of Purchaser.-Where a statute provides for recovery by the purchaser at a void tax sale of the purchase price or'taxes he paid,
that remedy is exclusive.
[17] !d.-Tax Sales-Right of Purchaser to Refund.-Rev. & Tax.
Code, §§ 3728, 3728.1, providing for refunds to purchasers under
a void tax sale, are based on the assumption that there are some
taxes payable, and are inapplicable to a purchase of untaxable
state-owned property.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County. C. M. Monroe, Judge. Affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
[15] Right of holder of tax title to reimbursement by taxing authorities where sale proves invalid; notes, 77 A.L.R. 824; 116 A.L.R.
1408. See, also, 24 Cal.Jur. 391, 394; 51 Am.Jur. 982.
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.Action to quiet title. Part of judgment quieting plaintiff's
title affirmed; part of judgment imposing condition that
plaintiff reimburse defendant for cost of tax deed and taxes
paid, reversed.
Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, .Attorneys General, and Walter S. Rountree and Dan Kaufmann, Deputy .Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and .Appellant.
Solon S. Kipp and W. E. Starke for Defendant and
.Appellant.
CARTER, J.-Both parties appeal from a decree quieting
title in plaintiff to a section of land in San Diego County
conditioned upon the reimbursement of defendant by plaintiff of the amount paid by defendant to obtain a tax deed
from plaintiff
In 1933, Mr. and Mrs. Busch were the owners of the property. In that year they conveyed the property to plaintiffstate. The latter through the State Park Commission
accepted the conveyance and made the property a part of
the state park system .
.At the time of the conveyance to the state there were
unpaid taxes levied by San Diego County on the property.
In 1934 the county instigated delinquent tax proceedings
by reason of those taxes and the property was ''sold'' to
plaintiff thereunder. In 1939 the property was conveyed
by tax deed to plaintiff for the delinquent 1933 taxes. On
March 11, 1940, the property was conveyed by tax deed
from plaintiff to defendant. Taxes have been levied on the
property for the years since then and paid by defendant. It
was to eliminate that tax deed, as a cloud on its title, which
prompted plaintiff to commence the instant action on May
28,1947.
Plaintiff's theory (and that of the trial court) is that the
tax lien on the property, when it received the conveyance
from the Busches, merged in its title thus acquired, and all
the delinquent tax proceedings, including the final deed,
were void for it owned the property which made it exempt
from taxation. (Cal. Const., art XIII, § 1.) [1] It is not
questioned that property belonging to the state is not subject to taxation, and taxation thereof, and tax deeds resultjng
therefrom are void. (See People v. Doe G. 1034, 36 Cal.
220; Warren v. Oity w County of San Francisco, 150 Cal.
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167 [88 P. 712] ; Los Angeles v. Board of Sttpervisors, 108
Cal.App. 655 [292 P. 539]; State Land Settlement Board v.
Henderson, 197 Cal. 470 [241 P. 560j; Sutter-Yuba Inv.
Co. v. Waste, 52 Cal.App.2d 785 [127 P.2d 25]; AndersonCottonwood I. Dist. v. Klukkert, 13 Cal.2d 191 [88 P.2d
685] ; Smith v. City of Santa Monica, 162 Cal. 221 [121 P.
920] ; W e'bste1· v. Board of Regents of U. C., 163 Cal. 705
[126 P. 974] .)
The main controversy concerns the effect of statutes of
limitation on plaintiff's action. In his amended answer defendant asserts that the action is barred by sections 315 and
345 of the Code of Civil Procedure and sections 175, 3521,
3725 and 3726 of the Revenue and Taxation Code.
[2, 3] The first provision invoked reads: "The people of
this state will not sue any person for or in respect to any
real property, or the issues or profits thereof, by reason of
the right or title of the people to the same, unless-1. Such
right or title shall have accrued within ten years before any
action or other proceeding for the same is commenced;
or, 2. The people, or those from whom they claim, shall have
received the rents and profits of such real property, or some
part thereof, within the space of ten years.'' (Code Civ.
Proc., § 315.) That section cannot bar the action for two
reasons : First, it will be remembered that defendant obtained his tax deed in 1940 and the action was commenced
in 1947, less than the 10-year limitation. Defendant argues
that the period commenced to run in 1933 when plaintiff
acquired title from the Busches, because the statute says
(subd. 1) that the time runs from the time of acquisition
by the plaintiff-state. 'l'hat contention was settled contrary
to defendant's assertion in 1885 by People v. Center, 66 Cal.
551, 564 [5 P. 263, 6 P. 481], where the court said the section
must be construed ''as declaring, in effect, that the people
of the state will not sue 'for or in respect to real property,'
except where the cause of action has accrued within ten
years." (Italics added.) The Center case has been consistently followed. (See People v. Banning Co., 167 Cal. 643
[140 P. 587]; People v. Kings County Dev. Co., 177 Cal. 529,
534 [171 P. 102]; Wilhoit v. Tubbs, 83 Cal. 279 [23 P. 386];
Doyle v. San Diego Land & Town Co., 43 F. 349.) The cause
of action would not accrue until defendant received his tax
deed on March 11, 1940.
[4, 5] Second, neither section 315 of the Code of Civil Procedure nor the provisions on adverse possession (limitations
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on actions for the recovery of real property, Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 318 et seq.) apply to property owned by the state and
devoted to a public use. (See Civ. Code, §§ 1006, 1007;
People v. Kerber, 152 Cal. 731 [93 P. 878, 125 .Am.St.Rep.
93]; Henry Cowell Lime & Cement Co. v. State, 18 Cal. 2d
169 [114 P.2d 331] ; Richer·t v. City of San Diego, 109 Cal..App.
548 [293 P. 673]; People v. Banning Co., supra, 167 Cal.
643; Ames v. San Diego, 101 Cal. 390 [35 P. 1005] ; Board
of Education v. Martin, 92 Cal. 209 [28 P. 799] ; San Francisco v. Straut, 84 Cal. 124 [24 P. 814]; Orack v. Powelson,
3 Cal..App. 282 [85 P. 129] ; San Francisco v. Calderwood,
31 Cal. 585 [91 .Am.Dec. 542] ; Fresno Irr. Dist. v. Smith,
58 Cal..App.2d 48 [136 P.2d 382] ; Cmtnty of Sacramento v.
Lauszus, 70 Cal..App.2d 639 [161 P.2d 460] ; Hoadley v.
San, Franm:sco, 50 Cal. 265; People v. Pope, 53 Cal. 437;
County of Yolo v. Barney, 79 Cal. 375 [21 P. 833, 12
.Am.St.Rep. 152] ; San Francisco v. Bradbury, 92 Cal. 414
[28 P. 803] ; Patton v. City of Los Angeles, 169 Cal. 521
[147 P. 141]; City of Los Angeles v. Forrester, 12 Cal..App.2d
146 [55 P.2d 277]; City of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co.,
209 Cal. 105 [287 P. 475]; Reclamation Dist. No. 833 v.
American Farms Co., 209 Cal. 74 [285 P. 688]; 1 Cal.Jur.
497-508.) Here, in 1933, the property was deeded to the
state by the Busches, accepted for the state by the State
Park Commission for park purposes and was included in
the state park system, and, the law provides that : ''The
State Park Commission shall administer, protect, and develop
the State park system for the use and enjoyment of the
public . . . . " (Pub. Resources Code, § 5003.)
[6] Defendant urges, however, that the plaintiff knew
in 1933 that the property was sold for taxes by San Diego
County to it for it is presumed to have been notified of it
(Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3440; Code Civ. Proc., § 1963 (15))
and that its title was then in jeopardy and the limitation
period started to run. It is difficult to see how it would
know its title was in jeopardy when the sale was to it, but
in any event that is merely another way of arguing that
title was lost under section 315 or the provisions on adverse
possession, for the relief would be against the county, not
defendant, and it would require "tacking" on limitation
periods (adding together the time while it ran in favor of
the county and defendant) which plainly is not applicable
except in adverse possession which is unavailable to defendant.
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[7a] Other limitation provisions asserted by defendant are
as follows: (1) A deed issued to the state by reason of delinquent taxes is conclusively presumed valid unless held invalid
in a proceeding to determine its validity commenced within
a year after the execution of the deed or after the effective
date of the statute (Stats. 1945, ch. 1017, § 1) whichever is
later. (Rev. & Tax. Code,§ 175); (2) "A proceeding based on
an alleged invalidity or irregularity of any deed to the State
for taxes or of any proceedings leading up to the deed can
only be commenced within one year after the date of recording of the deed to the State in the county recorder's office
or within one year after June 1, 1941, whichever is later."
(Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3521); and (3) "A proceeding based
on alleged invalidity or irregularity of any proceedings instituted under this chapter can only be commenced within
one year after the date of execution of the tax collector's
deed." (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3725.) The chapter deals with
sales to private parties after deed to the state. (Rev. & Tax.
Code, § 3691 et seq.)
Plaintiff argues that those provisions are not controlling
because they do not apply to the state and there was no
authority whatsoever for any of the tax proceedings-they
were a complete nullity.
[8] It has been held that general statutes of limitation
apply against various agencies of the state or the state when
its ''sovereign'' rights are not involved. (City of Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles, 9 Cal.2d 624 [72 P.2d 138,
113 A.L.R. 370], against a city when suing a county; San
Francisco v. Luning, 73 Cal. 610 [15 P. 311], against municipal corporations; People v. Melone, 73 Cal. 574 [15 P. 294],
against state; State Bd. of Health v. Alameda County, 42
Cal.App. 166 [183 P. 455], and Tehama County v. Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co., 33 Cal.App.2d 465 [91 P.2d 936], against
county; City of Fullerton v. County of Orange, 140 Cal.App.
464 [35 P.2d 397], against city in action by it against county;
People v. Osgood, 104 Cal.App. 133 [285 P. 753], against
state; People v. Kings County Dev. Co., 48 Cal.App. 72 [191
P. 1004] .) That rules springs from the code provision
reading: ''The limitations prescribed in this chapter apply
to actions brought in the name of the State or county or
for the benefit of the State or county, in the same manner
(Italics added.)
as to actions by private parties, . . . "
(Code Civ. Proc., § 345.)
The chapter referred to is chapter 3 of part 2, title 2
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of the code which deals with limitation for actions other than
for the recovery of real property. The latter type of actions including section 315, are in chapter 2. It has been
recognized that as to limitations in that chapter (3) that
the state has included itself. (San Francisco v. Luning,
supra, 73 Cal. 610; People v. Melone, supra, 73 Cal. 574;
State Bd. of Health v. Alarneda County, supra, 42 Cal.App.
166; Philbrick v. State Personnel Board, 53 Cal.App.2d
222 [127 P.2d 634].) People v. Osgood, supra, 104 Cal.App.
133, and People v. Kings Cot~nty Dev. Co., supra, 48 Cal.App.
72, state that the general policy of the state is to be bound
by statutes of limitation, but that is hardly in conformity
with the restricted wording of section 345, supra.
It has been, on the other hand, generally stated that
statutes of limitation do not apply against the state unless
expressly made applicable. (See Oakland v. Oakland. Water
Front Co., 118 Cal. 160 [50 P. 277]; Russ &; Sons Co. v.
Crichton, 117 Cal. 695 [49 P. 1043]; People v. City of Los
Angeles, 93 Cal.App. 532 [269 P. 934] ; Philbrick v. State
Personnel Board, supra, 53 Cal.App.2d 222; People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 593 [138 P. 79] .)
In Russ &; Sons Co. v. Crichton, supra, 117 Cal. 695, 699
the issue was whether a provision of the Political Code dealing with taxation, which provided that if a tax deed is not
made to the purchaser within a year and three months after
the act takes effect, the purchaser has no right thereunder,
applied to the issuance of a tax deed to the state. It was
held that it did not, and the court said: "In Tuttle v.
Block, 104 Cal. 443 [38 P. 109], it was held that the said
provision was 'clearly a prospective statute of limitation of
the time within which the tax deed must have been made';
and the rule is settled beyond all controversy that statutes
of limitation do not apply to or bind the state, unless they
are made to do so by express words or necessary implication.
"The language of the provision, 'in all cases,' etc., is
apparently broad enough to include the state; but a statute
will not always be held to include every case to which it may
appear on its face to be applicable." With respect to tax
statutes, the above statement is in line with the general rule
that tax statutes do not apply against the state as to its property. (People v. Doe G. 1034, S1tpra, 36 Cal. 220; Webster v.
Board of Regents of U. C., supra, 163 Cal. 705; Low v.
Lewis, 46 Cal. 549; Smith v. City of Santa Monica, supra,
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162 Cal. 221; Bolton v. Terra Bella Irr. Dist., 106 Cal.App.
313 [289P.678].)
[7b] In any event it seems that if the statutes on adverse
possession do not run against property of the state which is
dedicated to a public purpose (see authorities cited supra)
the opposite result should not be reached, depriving the
state of its property, by application to it of the provisions,
supra, of the Revenue and Taxation Code. We hold therefore that they do not apply to the state.
[9] Defendant claims that the authorities heretofore cited
with reference to the inapplicability of the limitation provisions in tax statutes were wiped out by the provision enacted
in 1939 (Stats. 1939, ch. 529, Pol. Code, § 3831.1, Rev. &
'fax. Code, § 121) which included the "state" in the definition of a "Taxing Agency." We do not think any such
result was intended. There is nothing said about any taxing
agencies in the sections of the Revenue and Taxation Code,
supra, invoked by defendant, and hence the "definition"
section would not seem to be applicable.
[10] In this same connection defendant urges, specifically,
that under section 3695 of the Revenue and Taxation Code,
the state consented to the tax sale. The code authorizes the
sale of property by the tax collector after deed to the state
upon approval of the county board of supervisors and the
State Controller. (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 3691, 3694.) "If
the governing body of any taxing agency does not, before
the date of sale, file with the tax collector and the board of
supervisors certified copies of a resolution adopted by the
governing body objecting to the sale, the taxing agency has
consented to the sale. If the taxing agency consents to the
sale the lien of its taxes or assessments and any rights which
it may have to the property as a result of such taxes or
assessments are canceled by a sale under this chapter and it
ifl entitled to its proper share of the proceeds deposited in
the delinquent tax sale trust fund . . . . "
(Rev. & Tax.
Code, § 3695.) (Italics added.) Assuming that the phrase
"taxing agency" as there used includes the state, it plainly
refers only to tax or assessment liens of governmental units
other than the county and makes provision for safeguarding
such interests when the county sells the property, and it is
only those liens which are cancelled if no objection to the
sale is made. That is evident from the italicized portion of
the section. Plaintiff-state here is not claiming title or interest by reason of any tax lien. Its title is founded upon the
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conveyance from the Busches in 1933. Nor can it be supposed that the State Controller, by his consent to the sale,
could authorize the divestiture of the state's title to property devoted to a public use. (See Smith v. City of Santa
Monica, 162 Cal. 221 [121 P. 920].)
[11] Section 3694
of the code requiring the Controller to approve the sale
of property tax deeded to the state, cannot be construed to
authorize him to covenant for the state to the conveyance
of its property, title to which was obtained from a source
other than a tax deed, and which is devoted to a public use.
[12, 13] Lands of the state, at least those devoted to a public
use, may be disposed of only in the manner specified by
statute. (Buck v. Canty, 162 Cal. 226 [121 P. 924] ; Messenger v. Kingsbury, 158 Cal. 611 [112 P. 65]) and an
attempt by a state officer, not authorized to dispose of state
land devoted to a public use, is void. (People v. California
Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576 [138 P. 79].)
As above noted the trial court made its decree conditional
on plaintiff's paying to defendant the amount he paid for the
property at the tax sale to him and for taxes subsequently
levied on the property by San Diego County. Plaintiff appeals from that portion of the judgment and defendant makes
no contention that it is correct. He relies solely upon his
asserted ownership of the property. [14] Nevertheless it
may be observed that it is the settled rule that a private
owner of property may not have his title quieted against
a tax deed unless he pays the purchaser at the tax sale and
deed holder the taxes paid by the latter. [15] But in the
absence of statute, a purchaser from the state or public
agency at a tax sale cannot recover from the seller the purchase price paid or the taxes subsequently assessed even
though the taxes were illegally assessed or levied, the property was not subject to taxation or the tax deed was void.
(Routh v. Quinn, 20 Cal.2d 488 [127 P.2d 1, 149 A.L.R. 215] ;
Loomis v. County of Los Angeles, 59 Cal. 456; Brooks v.
County of Tulare, 117 Cal. 465 [49 P. 469]; Bell v. County of
Los Angeles, 90 Cal.App. 602 [266 P. 291]; Coleman v.
County of Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 714 [182 P. 440]; Holland
v. Hotchkiss, 162 Cal. 366 [123 P. 258, L.R.A. 1915C 492);
24 Cal.Jur. 391-2; 77 A.L.R. 824; 116 A.L.R. 1408.)
[16] \Vhere a statute provides for recovery, that remedy is
exclusive. (See Bell Y. County of Los Angeles, supra, 90
Cal.App. 602; Southern Service Co., Ltd., v. Los Angeles,
15 Cal.2d 1, 11 [97 P.2d 963].) There are statutory provi-
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sions with reference to reimbursement in this state.
The basic rule applicable is: ''The purchaser of tax sold
or tax deeded property is entitled to a refund of the amount
paid as purchase price whenever it is determined by the
board of supervisors that the property belongs to the United
States, this State, a city, or other political subdivision of
this State and should not have been sold for taxes. The
refund shall be made in the same manner as a refund of an
overpayment of tax." (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3730.) Thus
it is seen that the county must make a refund of the purchase
price.
[17] There are other provisions for refunds but they
plainly deal with situations where the taxes are validly levied
and payable but the deed is void. Then the refund to the
purchaser should be made by the owner or taxpayer. Before
holding void a tax deed given under certain provisions of
the code the court shall determine the correct amount of
taxes, penalties and costs that should be paid upon redemption to discharge the tax liens of all taxing agencies "had
the purported tax sale not been held'' and shall order the
former owner to pay from such amount in six months to the
purchaser the amount expended by him in pursuit of the
"State's title to the property" and for improvements and to
the county the balance. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 3728.) If the
amount is not paid within the time fixed a new deed shall
be "issued." (I d. § 3728.1.) Those provisions are based
on the assumption that there are some taxes payable. Here
there can be none, for the property was not taxable, and
they apply where the owner, when the property was taxed,
was a private person rather than the state.
The portion of the judgment quieting plaintiff's title is
affirmed. The portion imposing the reimbursement condition
is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and
Schauer, J., concurred.

